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(decided June 20, 1994)
The defendant, charged with robbery, claimed that a statement
made by him at the precinct shortly after his arrest and
subsequent identification testimony should be suppressed based
upon a violation of his constitutional rights under the Federal
Constitution327 and the New York State Constitution. 328 The
Supreme Court, Queens County, granted the defendant's motion
to suppress the statement but denied the defendant's motion to
suppress the identification testimony.
32 9
The defendant was identified by the victim of the robbery as
the perpetrator.330 According to a detective's testimony at trial,
six days later the police went to the defendant's home. When the
defendant's thirteen year-old sister answered the door, the
326. 161 Misc. 2d 484, 615 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1994).
327. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
328. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Section 12 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
329. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 488, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
330. People v. Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 20, 1994, at 25 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1994). Portions of the opinion were omitted for publication; however,
the omitted portions, including the facts leading up to the defendant's arrest,
can be found in the New York Law Journal cited above. The victim identified
the defendant by photographs contained at the precinct. Id.
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detective identified himself as a police officer and asked to speak
with the defendant. 331 When the defendant came to the door, the
detective told him that he had been identified in a robbery and
asked defendant to go to the precinct with him for additional
investigation. The defendant agreed and went with the police,
unhandcuffed, to the precinct. 332 At the precinct, he was advised
that he was under arrest and that he would have to participate in a
lineup. After the defendant spoke with his father, he was advised
of his Miranda fights, which the defendant waived. The
defendant thereafter wrote and signed an inculpatory statement.
The lineup was then conducted, where the complainant identified
the defendant as the man who had robbed him.333 In contrast, the
defendant's thirteen year-old sister claimed that when she opened
the door, one officer came into the apartment, while other
waited outside, and told her brother that he had to come to the
precinct. 334 The defendant claimed that since the police
unlawfully entered his home and arrested him in violation of
Payton v. New York, 335 his statement and the identification
testimony must be suppressed. In addition, the defendant claimed
that the photographic procedure and lineup were unduly
suggestive. 336
The court held that the police had probable cause to arrest the
defendant pursuant to the complainant's photo identification of
the defendant. 337 However, the court also suppressed statements
33 1. See Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 25.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 25-26.
335. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (requiring arrest warrants for routine in-home
felony arrests).
336. See Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. The defendant claimed
that the pre-trial photo procedure was unduly suggestive because his
photograph appeared twice in the three or four books which the complainant
reviewed. Id.
337. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 485, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 255. See People v.
Green. 157 A.D.2d 745, 746, 550 N.Y.S.2d 41, 42 (2d Dep't 1990) (denying
defendant's motion to suppress his statement made to law enforcement
authorities where his arrest "was based upon a prior photographic
identification by a witness to his crime so that probable cause unquestionably
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made by the defendant subsequent to his arrest based on a Payton
violation. 33 8 In analyzing whether the defendant's arrest was
lawful, the court further looked to the "totality of the
circumstances," 339 and found that the "People have [not] met
their burden of proving consent [to enter the defendant's
apartment] beyond a reasonable doubt." 340 Therefore, this court
found that there was a Payton violation.
34 1
With respect to the admissibility of the defendant's statements,
the court examined the decision of People v. Harris.342 In
Harris, the police developed probable cause to believe that the
existed"); People v. Montanez, 151 A.D.2d 616, 616, 543 N.Y.S.2d 925, 925
(2d Dep't 1989) (finding that "[u]pon the complainant's selection of the
defendant's photograph from the array, the police had probable cause to arrest
him").
338. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 485, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
339. Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. In Medina, the court looked at
the age of defendant's sister (thirteen), and her "actual or apparent authority to
consent to the police entry into the apartment. ... " Id. See People v.
Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 347 N.E.2d 575, 582, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 221
(1976). In Gonzalez, the court ruled that defendants' written consents to search
an apartment were involuntary because the totality of facts negated a finding of
free will where one defendant resisted arrest outside of the apartment while the
other defendant refused to open the door. Id.; People v. Zimmerman, 101
A.D.2d 294, 296-297, 475 N.Y.S.2d 127, 128-129 (2d Dep't 1984). In
evaluating the "totality of the circumstances," the Appellate Division, Second
Department, held that the People met their burden of proving defendant's
consent to a police search of the trunk of his daughter's car since the
defendant, who had a record of prior arrests, appeared calm and cooperated
with the police and upon the officer's request, opened the trunk without
hesitation or concern. Id.
340. Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. See United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974) (finding that the Government met its "burden of
proving by the preponderance of the evidence that [defendant's wife'sl
voluntary consent to search the east bedroom was legally sufficient to warrant
admitting into evidence the $4,995 found in the diaper bag"); see also People
v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d at 128, 347 N.E.2d at 580, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 219
(stating that the People have a "heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of
the purported consents").
341. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 485, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
342. 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991)
(suppressing evidence where defendant was subjected to an illegal arrest and
then made an inculpatory statement in his apartment and later at the precinct).
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defendant killed his girlfriend. Police went to defendant's home
and arrested him without a warrant, in violation of Payton.343
Approximately one hour after his arrest, the defendant admitted
again that he committed the murder; this confession was used at
trial, where he was convicted of second-degree murder.
344 The
appellate division affirmed his conviction3 45 and the New York
Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the station house
confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest and unredeemed by
attenuation. 3
46
The United States Supreme Court reversed, 347 holding that the
police illegality was in the entry, not the arrest, and that exit
from the apartment necessarily broke any causal connection
between the wrong and the later statement.348 The Supreme
Court, in Harris, formulated a per se rule of attenuation holding
that "where the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect,
the exclusionary rule does not bar the State's use of a statement
made by the defendant outside of his home, even though the
343. Id. at 435-36, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 702. In Payton,
the police, acting on probable cause that the defendant murdered a manager of
a gas station, broke into defendant's home without a warrant and found a .30
caliber shell casing which was later admitted into evidence at trial. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 574 (1983). The United States Supreme Court held
"that the Fourth Amendment... prohibits the police from making a
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a
routine felony arrest." Id. at 576.
344. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 436, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
345. People v. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1st Dep't
1986).
346. People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 618-619, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 1231,
536 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3-4 (1991). The court implemented the attenuation analysis of
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975), which stated that three factors
to be considered are: "The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession,
the presence of intervening circumstances .... and, particularly, the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct... "Id. In Harris, the New York
Court of Appeals, in finding only a brief lapse of time between these two
statements, concluded that the station house confession was the fruit of the
illegal arrest. 72 N.Y.2d at 621, 532 N.E.2d at 1232-1233, 536 N.Y.S.2d at
5.
347. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990).
348. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 436, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
19951 1149
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statement is taken after an arrest made in the home in violation of
Payton."349 The Court, in Harris, reasoned that although the
entry was unlawful, probable cause did exist for Harris'
subsequent custody and removal to the station house, and
therefore, the police had justification to question him prior to his
arrest.350
However, when the United States Supreme Court remanded the
Harris case to the New York Court of Appeals, 35 1 the court of
appeals did not follow the Supreme Court's new per se rule.
Rather, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that the
federal rule did not go far enough to protect the privacy rights of
New York citizens, and decided to apply state constitutional law
instead of federal constitutional law. 352 Under New York law,
search and seizure and right to counsel law is much more
protective of individual rights than under federal law. 353 Thus,
New York's broad and unique right to counsel rule requires
rejection of the Supreme Court's per se rule.
Contrary to the federal system, where a defendant's right to
counsel does not attach when an arrest warrant is issued, 354 "in
New York once an arrest warrant is authorized, criminal
proceedings have begun, the indelible right to counsel attaches
349. Harris, 495 U.S. at 21.
350. Id. at 17-18.
351. Id. at 21.
352. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
See People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) ("Although State courts may not circumscribe
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, they may interpret their own law
to supplement or expand them."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987)
353. See P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304, 501 N.E.2d at 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d
at 913 (stating that New York "has adopted independent standards under the
State Constitution when doing so best promotes 'predictability and precision in
judicial review of search and seizure cases and the protection of the individual
rights of our citizens.'" (citation omitted)).
354. See United States v. Pace, 833 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987) ("We
see no reason in principle why the filing of a complaint should be deemed to
give rise to a right to counsel immediately upon arrest pursuant to warrant.").
1150 [Vol I11
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and police may not question a suspect in the absence of an
attorney." 355
Thus, under federal law, there may be little incentive for the
police to follow Payton in hopes of obtaining a statement and
therefore, the incremental deterrent value coming from
suppressing the statement would be minimal. 356 If the police
officers wished to interrogate without an attorney present, their
chances of doing so would be much greater if they did not obtain
an arrest warrant. The New York Court of Appeals, in Harris,
recognized that New York police "have every reason to violate
Payton, therefore, because doing so enables them to circumvent
the accused's indelible right to counsel," 357 and a deterrent to
such police activity was deemed necessary by the court. The
Harris court thus reasoned that the police "should not enjoy
greater. latitude simply because they neglected to obtain a
warrant, as Payton requires, and entered the apartment
illegally." 358
Therefore, to protect New York citizens from Payton
violations, the New York State Constitution requires that
statements obtained from an accused following an arrest without
a warrant in violation of Payton must be suppressed unless the
taint resulting from the violation has been attenuated. 359 Relying
on the history of the Harris decision, the Medina court
suppressed the defendant's statement because the "statement was
made shortly after his arrest, and in 'the absence of intervening
circumstances', ... [there was] no attenuation between the
Payton violation and his statement." 360
355. Haris, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705
(citing People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d
892 (1980); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 385 N.E.2d 612, 412 N.Y.S.2d
874 (1978)).
356. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1054-55, 568 N.Y.S.2d at
705-06.
357. Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 441, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
360. People v. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d 484, 486, 615 N.Y.S.2d 254, 255
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1994).
1995] 1151
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With respect to the admissibility of the complainant's
identification testimony, the Medina court had to first determine
whether the holding in Harris applied to lineups.36 1 The court
recognized that there was much support for not applying the
decision in Harris to lineups. In People v. Murray,362 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that, although there
was an illegal arrest, the defendant's statements made at the
precinct and the identifications made by the victims would not
require suppression because the police had probable cause to
arrest the defendant.
363
The court in Medina held that the Harris holding did not apply
to lineups conducted after Payton violations. 364 Even if Harris
did apply, the court found that the People have established that
the lineup was attenuated from the legal entry. 365 The Medina
court reasoned that the lineup identification did not result from
the illegal police conduct in entering the defendant's apartment
and therefore was not the "fruit of an unlawful arrest. "366 The
police obtained the photo identification prior to the Payton
violation, 3 67 thus giving them probable cause to arrest the
defendant. The court held that the "lineup 'flowed directly' from
361. Id. at 486, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56. If the Harris holding did apply,
the "lineup could be found admissible only if it was not the 'product of the
illegality,'" since defendant's right to counsel started with the illegal entry. Id.
If the Harris holding did not apply, then the case has to be "decided as 'a pure
Fourth Amendment search and seizure dwelling protection case... and no
attenuation would be necessary.. . .'" Id. (citation omitted).
362. 169 A.D.2d 843, 565 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1991).
363. Id. at 844, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
364. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 487, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
365. Id.
366. Id. See People v. Hunt, 155 A.D.2d 957, 595, 547 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969
(4th Dep't 1984) (finding that to constitute a fruit of an illegal arrest the
identification must have "flowed directly" from the illegal arrest); see also
People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408, 417, 462 N.E.2d 1159, 1164, 474 N.Y.S.2d
441, 446 (1984) ("Inasmuch as the lineup identification followed directly from
the illegal arrest and detention of defendant, it was error to admit evidence of
that identification at trial.").
367. See People v. Parris, 136 A.D.2d 882, 883, 525 N.Y.S.2d 445. 447
(4th Dep't 1988) (finding that evidence does not have to be suppressed if it is
"the product of a source unrelated to defendant's arrest").
1152 [Vol 11
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the photo identification, an 'independent source,' 3 68 unrelated to
the defendant's illegal arrest, which was in the 'grasp' 369 of the
police prior to their illegal entry into the defendant's home, and
so is 'sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.' 370
The Medina court relied on People v. Pleasant37 1 where the
New York Court of Appeals held that a lineup or in-court
identification did not have to be suppressed as a "forbidden fruit"
of the defendant's unlawful arrest because a robbery victims'
ability to identify defendant was not tainted by the unlawful
seizure. 372 In addition, the court noted that, just because an
arrest is illegal, "does not automatically result in suppression of
any evidence obtained subsequent to arrest." 373 Based on the
368. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 487, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 256. See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1971) (finding that evidence "learned
of. . . 'from an independent source'" does not have to be suppressed (citing
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920)).
369. See People v. Love, 187 A.D.2d 1030, 591 N.Y.S.2d 111 (4th Dep't
1992). In Love, the defendant's photograph used in the photo array was taken
before his illegal arrest, and that "the unlawful detention 'yielded nothing of
evidentiary value that the police did not already have in their grasp.'" Id. at
1030, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 112 (citing United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475
(1980)).
370. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 487, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 256. See Wong Sun.
371 U.S. at 488 (stating that the question that needs to be raised is whether the
means used to obtain this evidence were "sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint").
371. 54 N.Y.2d 972, 430 N.E.2d 905, 446 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1981) (affirming
order of Appellate Division which denied defendant's motion to suppress all
identification testimony as a result of an illegal arrest), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
924 (1982).
372. Id. at 973-974, 430 N.E.2d at 906-907, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 30-31. See
People v. O'Brien, 178 A.D.2d 617, 577 N.Y.S.2d 492 (2d Dep't 1991). In
O'Brien, the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for robbery but
a Payton violation did occur. However, the court held that the inculpatory
statements and lineup identification were "sufficiently attenuated" and were not
the product of the illegal arrest. Id. at 618, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 492-493.
373. People v. Allah, 140 A.D.2d 613, 613, 529 N.Y.S.2d 5, 5 (2d Dep't
1988) (finding that "the subsequent lineup identification was not tainted by the
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foregoing case law, the Medina court upheld the complainant's
identification testimony and thus it did not have to be suppressed
on Payton grounds. 374
Next, the court had to determine "whether the pre-trial
photographic procedure was so unnecessarily suggestive as to
taint the later corporeal identification and create a likelihood that
the witness' potential in-court identification would be tainted as
well.' 375 The standard used by the court was the "totality of the
circumstances. " 37 6 "The primary evil to be avoided is 'a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."
377
The court held that the photographic procedure was not unduly
suggestive in that the books contained many pictures of male
Hispanics of the same approximate age as the defendant. 378 The
court also found that just because the defendant's picture
appeared twice "does not render it unnecessarily suggestive." 379
374. Medina, 161 Misc. 2d at 488, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
375. Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. Portions of the opinion were
omitted for publication.
376. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (finding that "a
claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation
depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it . . ."). In Stovall,
the Supreme Court examined the surrounding circumstances and found that the
showing of the perpetrator to the victim in her hospital room was permissible
because the victim was the only one who could possibly exonerate the accused.
Id.
377. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). In Biggers, the
Supreme Court, in finding "no substantial likelihood of misidentification,"
looked at several factors including; whether the witness was able to view the
criminal during the crime, "the witness' degree of attention; the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the criminal; the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation." Id. at 199.
378. Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. See People v. Alamo, 157
A.D.2d 608, 550 N.Y.S.2d 627 (lst Dep't 1990). In Alamo, the complainant
identified the defendant after looking at approximately 100 photographs. The
Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the defendant's conviction of
robbery, holding that "[t]he volume of photographs viewed and the scope of
the procedure involved militate against the presence of suggestiveness." Id. at
608, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
379. Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. See People v. Trolano, 198
A.D.2d 385, 385, 603 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (2d Dep't 1993) (holding that a
1154 [Vol 11
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With regard to the lineup, the court found that since the others
in the lineup were similar to the defendant in age, skin color and
physical characteristics, "it was not unduly suggestive," 380 did
not taint the potential in-court identification, and need not be
suppressed. 3
8 '
In conclusion, although the wording of the State and Federal
Constitutions is identical, New York's independent body of
search and seizure and right to counsel law is much more
protective of an individual's rights than the federal law.
slide viewing was not unduly suggestive just because there were three slides of
the defendant among 200 slides); People v. Boiling, 148 A.D.2d 622, 623, 539
N.Y.S.2d 85, 86 (2d Dep't 1989) (finding that where the witness selected
more than one picture of the perpetrator, and of the chosen pictures, only the
defendant's picture is used in a second array with pictures not seen before, this
procedure was not "so impermissibly suggestive as to rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification" because the victim saw the
perpetrators' faces for approximately 10 minutes and a different picture of the
defendant was used in the second array); People v. Shaw, 145 A.D.2d 515,
515-16, 535 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (2d Dep't 1988). Where the victim was first
shown approximately 100 photographs and then shown two series of Polaroid
photographs, the Slunv court found that "the separate showings of the
defendant's photograph, without more, were not impermissibly suggestive."
Id.
380. See Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26. See People v.
Cunningham, 110 A.D.2d 708, 709, 487 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (2d Dep't 1985)
(finding that lineup was not unduly suggestive because the participants in the
line-up were "approximately the same age, height, weight and build as
defendant, and had similar skin tones, hairstyles and clothing as he did").
381. See Medina, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1994, at 26.
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